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Introduction
Charles Edmund Kingsmill was the founder of the Canadian 
navy. He was the principal technical 
advisor to the Canadian government 
in the creation of the navy in 1908-10, 
and became the professional head of 
the new service for its first ten years, 
1910-1920. The government selected 
Kingsmill because of his naval 
expertise. He repeatedly called upon 
this expertise during the challenging 
period of political controversy and 
limited resources that attended 
the navy’s birth and threatened to 
destroy the young service.1 
  Kingsmill’s expertise came from 
nearly 40 years of service as an 
officer in Britain’s Royal Navy, the 
world’s strongest and arguably 
most effective fighting sea service 
at the time. He served on most 
types of warships in most parts of 
the world. Although Kingsmill, at 
just 14 years of age, left his native 
Ontario to join the Royal Navy as 
a midshipman, his allegiance and 
outlook was Canadian. He showed a 
deep understanding of the distinction 
between British Empire and Canadian 
interests in maritime armed forces at 
a time when that distinction was 
anything but clear. Kingsmill, with 
his firm grasp of the practical needs 
of maritime sovereignty and security, 
and understanding of the Canadian 
political and social situation, did 
much to clarify that distinction, and 
acted effectively to advance Canadian 
interests.
Background
Kingsmill was the grandson of William Kingsmill, an officer 
in the British regular army who had 
served in the Peninsular campaign 
against Napoleon. In 1833, while 
on service in the British garrison 
in Upper Canada, William retired 
from the army to settle in the new 
country. He held a number of civil 
government posts and was ultimately 
postmaster at Guelph, Ontario. In 
1837-38 he came out of active militia 
service to organize units to counter 
the rebellion led by William Lyon 
Mackenzie and guard the Niagara 
frontier against intervention by 
American sympathizers. William 
Kingsmill’s seventh child was John 
Juchereau Kingsmill (1829-1900), 
who became a prominent lawyer in 
Guelph. He was Crown Attorney 
from 1856-1866, and in 1867 was 
appointed judge of Bruce County. 
John Juchereau’s first child, Charles 
Edmund, was born in Guelph on 7 
July 1855.
 Young Charles attended Upper 
Canada College in Toronto, as his 
father and uncles had before him. 
In September 1869, he travelled to 
England to train as an officer cadet 
in the Royal Navy, as a nominee of 
the then governor-general of Canada, 
Lord Lisgar. At that time it was not 
uncommon for Canadians wishing 
to become professional (ie. full-time) 
members of the armed forces, to join 
the British services. Canadians – 
considered British citizens who lived 
overseas – had the right to join the 
British armed services on much the 
same basis as residents of the British 
Isles. 
Establishment of the 
Canadian Navy
By about the mid-19th century Britain determined that its self-
governing colonies should become 
more responsible for their own 
defence. This was one of the main 
reasons why the government in 
London promoted confederation of 
the British North American colonies 
into the new “dominion” of Canada 
in 1867. The issue, however, was 
land forces, not naval forces. Canada 
began to establish its first small units 
of regular troops in 1871, the year 
in which the last of British army 
Following is a background paper and the first of a series of historical documents assembled to support the creation 
of a Ontario provincial plaque in honour of Admiral Kingsmill by the Ontario Heritage Trust. Further documents 
with commentaries will be published in forthcoming issues to help mark the Navy’s centennial. Warm thanks to Beth 
Anne Mendes, Coordinator, Plaque Programs, Ontario Heritage Trust, who managed the project and assisted with 
the writing and editting, and to Dr. Robert Davison, Wilfrid Laurier University, who assisted with the research.
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garrisons on station in central 
Canada withdrew. 
 There was no question of 
Canada raising its own naval 
forces.2 In the negotiations 
on defence at  the t ime of 
Confederation, Britain promised 
continued naval protection. 
The Royal Navy retained its 
dockyards at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, and Esquimalt, British 
Columbia, to support warships 
of the North America and West 
Indies station and the Pacific 
station that operated regularly 
in Canadian waters.
 By the early 20th century 
Britain looked to its self-governing 
colonies for naval assistance to 
meet increased international 
rivalry. Because of that rivalry 
the Royal Navy concentrated its 
fleet in European waters, closed 
the dockyards at Halifax and 
Esquimalt, and removed the 
warships permanently stationed 
in the western Atlantic and 
eastern Pacific at the end of 
1904. Canada’s prime minister, 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, faced sharp 
disagreement between English-
s p e a k i n g  C a n a d i a n s  w h o 
advocated defence cooperation 
with Britain, and French-speaking 
Canadians who believed that any 
form of naval initiative would 
be ultimately controlled by the 
British Admiralty which would 
draw the country into every 
British conflict overseas. Laurier’s 
compromise was to develop the 
government’s civil marine fleet, 
and particularly the Fisheries 
Protection Service, into a national 
navy for the defence of the 
oceans adjacent to the country’s 
coasts. The dockyards at Halifax 
and Esquimalt, which Canada’s 
department of Marine and Fisheries 
took over, were a valuable resource. 
Still, the government needed an 
experienced senior officer to lead the 
effort, specifically someone who was 
sensitive to Canadian demographics, 
Royal Navy to take command of 
the Canadian government’s civil 
fleet and improve the very basic 
program of naval training already 
started in the largest of the armed 
fisheries protection steamers, 
Canadian Government Ship 
Canada. In 1909, Britain was very 
concerned about German naval 
expansion. This threat prompted 
English-speaking Canadians to 
demand that Canada must do 
more, and Kingsmill produced 
a plan for a modest Canadian 
naval service. Advice from 
Britain resulted in the Laurier 
government quickly establishing 
the new Canadian Navy3 in 
1910, with plans for a larger fleet 
than Kingsmill’s scheme, but it 
was a logical development of 
his plan. The Naval Service Bill 
was introduced into the House 
of Commons in January 1910. It 
received Royal Assent on 4 May 
1910 and created a department 
of the naval service under the 
minister of Marine and Fisheries.
 A director of the naval 
service was provided for in the 
naval act, to be the professional 
head of the service, preferably 
with a rank not lower than 
that of rear-admiral. Charles 
Edmund Kingsmill  became 
the first director of the naval 
service and would serve until 
his retirement in 1920. Kingsmill 
firmly grasped the possibilities 
for a Canadian navy that , 
although built on British models, 
would be shaped by Canada’s 
particular maritime interests, 
such as the close protection 
of the coastline and ports, the 
gathering of marine intelligence 
for the government in Ottawa, 
and the enforcement of fisheries 
regulations. He understood how 
those interests differed from Britain’s 
larger international concerns, such 
as the defence of shipping around 
the world that supplied the British 
economy, a global mission that 
Admiral Sir Charles Edmund Kingsmill
politics and requirements. Laurier 
selected Kingsmill, whose success in 
the Royal Navy was well known, and 
whose family was active in public life 
and sympathetic to the Liberal party.
 In 1908 Kingsmill retired with 
the rank of rear-admiral from the 
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precluded attention to more local 
Canadian needs. 
  Almost immediately in 1910 
intense division between English and 
French speaking opinion in Canada 
slowed down the development 
of the new navy. In 1911 when 
Robert Borden’s Conservatives came 
into power they stopped all naval 
development, slashing the budget 
and ending recruitment of personnel. 
Kingsmill was bitterly discouraged, 
but remained a loyal and devoted 
public servant. He never spoke 
out in public and scrupulously 
respected the British principle of 
the supremacy of the civil authority 
over the military, a principle that 
was strongly embedded in Canadian 
practice.4 Kingsmill used his energies 
to press forward with war planning 
and such training as was possible 
with the resources he had available. 
He gave particular priority to the 
training of young Canadian officer 
cadets, as they were the hope for 
the future of the service. The Royal 
Naval College of Canada, established 
at Halifax early in 1911, remained 
open to receive new classes each year 
despite the severe budget cuts. The 
plan was that the cadets, after the two 
years of work ashore at the College, 
would then receive sea training in 
two cruisers, HMCS Niobe on the 
Atlantic coast, and HMCS Rainbow on 
the Pacific, whose purchase from the 
Royal Navy Kingsmill had arranged 
in 1910. These ships could not get 
to sea however, as the budget cuts 
left too few personnel to crew them. 
Kingsmill therefore obtained places 
for the cadets on British warships.
 Although the Canadian navy 
had shrunk to only 350 personnel, 
when war broke out in August 1914 
the service was able to implement 
basic coast defence measures thanks 
to the planning and preparations 
Kingsmill had organized. Britain 
provided large warships for offshore 
defence. With assistance from British 
and Newfoundland personnel 
and Canadian volunteers, the two 
Canadian cruisers were able to 
get to sea to join the British forces 
in protecting shipping in North 
American waters. Eventually the 
Naval Service recruited over 9,600 
officers and ratings during the course 
of the War.
 In 1915 Germany began to use 
submarines to attack British shipping. 
The large British and Canadian 
warships  were  vulnerable  to 
submarine attack, but the Royal Navy 
had no anti-submarine warships to 
spare. Kingsmill never relented in his 
pressure on the Royal Navy to more 
effectively assist in Canadian waters, 
but as it became clear the British 
were unable to adequately counter 
the German submarines hunting in 
British waters, he led efforts to use 
any and all Canadian resources. 
The navy took up government and 
civilian ships that had the speed 
and sea keeping qualities needed 
for anti-submarine duties, armed 
these vessels, and hurriedly trained 
Canadian volunteers to crew them. 
In 1917-1918 the Canadian navy 
department worked with the British 
Admiralty to build a 160 small anti-
submarine vessels in Canada, and 
Kingsmill persuaded the Admiralty 
to allocate many of these to expand 
the Canadian force. In these efforts, 
Kingsmill took care not to disturb the 
training of the young Canadian officer 
Top: Canadian Government Ship Canada as she appeared when 
completed by her British builders, Vickers Sons and Maxim, in 1904.
Above: HMS Niobe arriving at Halifax, NS, 21 October 1910 to being 
service as the first of “His Majesty’s Canadian Ships.”
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cadets, leaving them to continue to 
serve in major British warships in 
more active theatres. He used his 
connections to find experienced 
Royal Navy officers, many of them 
retired, to organize and command 
the new small-ship anti-submarine 
flotilla. 
 Throughout the war, Kingsmill 
resisted Royal Navy efforts to control 
operations at Canadian ports, which 
were vital for the shipment of troops 
and war material to the United 
Kingdom. Using the experienced 
former Royal Navy officers he had 
invited into Canadian service, he 
strengthened the navy’s coastal 
commands and intelligence gathering 
organization to better assert Canada’s 
authority, and work on a more equal 
basis with Britain. The Canadian navy 
was thus able to take an effective part 
in cooperation with the American 
and British navies, in the defence 
of shipping in the western Atlantic 
when large German submarines 
crossed the ocean in the summer 
and fall of 1918. This experience 
convinced even Conservative Prime 
Minister Robert Borden (1911-1920) 
that the country required the navy the 
Laurier government had established 
with Kingsmill’s advice.
Kingsmill’s Legacy
At the t ime of  Kingsmil l ’s retirement in 1920, the small 
staff of experienced ex-Royal Navy 
officers he had assembled in Ottawa 
was developing detailed plans for 
the navy’s future on the basis of the 
experience of 1914-18. Government 
cuts to military spending in the 
1920s made these plans largely 
theoretical, but they became the 
basis for rebuilding the navy in the 
late 1930s and the foundation for the 
massive expansion of the service in 
the Second World War. That growth, 
and the significant Canadian naval 
contribution to the western alliance 
in the early Cold War would be led 
by Canadian naval officers to whose 
recruitment and training Kingsmill 
had devoted such attention. 
 Dur ing  the  course  o f  h i s 
expansive career Kingsmill was 
well-recognized for his impressive 
service and contributions. He was 
made an Officer of the French Legion 
of Honour and a Grand Officer 
of the Crown of Italy. In 1913, he 
was promoted on the British Royal 
Navy’s retired list to vice-admiral, 
then to full admiral in 1917. He was 
knighted by King George V in 1918. 
He died in 1935 at his summer home 
on Grindstone Island, near Portland, 
Ontario and is buried in Emmanuel 
Anglican Cemetery, Portland.
Notes
1. For further reading: Gilbert Norman 
Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada; Its 
Official History: Vol.I. Origins and Early 
Years (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952). 
Contains much information still not 
readily available in any other published 
source; Michael L. Hadley and Roger 
Sarty, Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian 
Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 
1880-1918 (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991). 
Incorporates military and political history 
scholarship published since Tucker’s 
volume appeared, and archival material 
from Canadian, British, U.S. and German 
archives to which his team did not have 
access; Richard H. Gimblett, “Admiral 
Sir Charles E. Kingsmill: Forgotten 
Father,” in Michael Whitby, Richard H. 
Gimblett and Peter Haydon, eds., The 
Admirals: Canada’s Senior Naval Leadership 
in the Twentieth Century  (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 2006), 31-53. The fullest 
biographical account of Kingsmill; 
Roger Sarty, The Maritime Defence of 
Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1996). Contains essays 
on the origins of the navy, the navy and 
development of Canadian sovereignty, 
and the defence of the Pacific coast in the 
era of the First World War that shed light 
on Kingsmill’s role.
2. In 1881, there was an early attempt to 
establish a Canadian navy, when the 
young country acquired a steam-powered 
wooden vessel, HMS Charybdis from the 
Royal Navy as a training ship. The vessel, 
however, proved to need such expensive 
repairs that the Canadian government 
returned her to the British.
3. The service became the Royal Canadian 
Navy (RCN) in 1911 when King George 
V granted permission to add the pre-fix 
“Royal.” 
4. Kingsmill was a prolific correspondent 
on professional matters in letters and 
memoranda that survive in the records of 
the navy, and the papers of such public 
figures as Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Robert 
Borden, and Louis-Philippe Brodeur, 
held at Library and Archives Canada and 
other Ottawa area archives. He was not 
shy about expressing his views, but did 
so only to other officials and his political 
masters. An accurate summation of 
Kingsmill’s place in published historical 
literature is the sub-title of Richard 
Gimblett’s biographical article: ‘Forgotten 
Father’ of the navy.
HMCS Rainbow at Esquimalt, BC.
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Officer Commanding
Marine Service of Canada
Ottawa, April 19, 1909
 
Sir, 
 It is with a strong feeling of diffidence 
that I submit, singlehanded, a scheme 
of Naval Defence for Canada, and 
wish to say that my views are given 
after due consideration of the fact that 
monetary contribution alone is out of the 
question, and that we must develop our 
Naval assistance to the Empire with this 
end always in view, that the Canadian 
Navy is to be under the control of the 
Dominion Government, the question of 
its disposition in the even of War being a 
matter for those in authority at the time; 
also that at an early date we must use 
the newly started Naval Service for the 
Protection of our Fisheries, in fact, that 
Fisheries Protection and Training go hand 
in hand, thus using the appropriation 
for the former in carrying out the latter 
which , of course, will be a considerable 
assistance and in the end a better use will 
have been made of the money.
 Understanding that the above is the 
plan on which you wish me to work, I 
submit the following:
A. The first, and one of the principal 
things Canada should do for the 
defence of the Empire and for her 
own benefit, is the provision of proper 
Dock accommodation and the proper 
defence of her already fortified Ports. 
The necessity for this is so apparent that 
I do not enter in explanation.
1. Halifax and Esquimalt [ink insertion: 
“or a properly fortified Port on Pacific 
Coast”] should have their Dry Docks 
brought up to date and their Machine 
Shops kept in working order either by 
Government or by subsidizing private 
Concerns. A dock should be built at 
Quebec and at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 
and the latter fortified and made a Naval 
Base. I will call these our Naval Bases.
2. The proper defence of these Naval 
Bases should be undertaken; I am not 
referring to the forts, now, but to the 
narrowing of the Navigable Channel by 
sinking obstructions in time of War, or 
by properly organized boom defence.
3. The Establishment of Examination 
Service: this would come under the 
Military Authorities, but the Vessels used 
would belong to Naval Department. (I 
may point out here that this one matter 
shows how desirable it is that we should 
have Interdepartmental Committees.)
4. The proper organization of our 
Coastal Signal Service and the 
connecting up by wire of all important 
observing Stations. This is a very 
important matter – in Great Britain it is 
undertaken by the Coast Guard and the 
Government Telegraph Department, 
(with headquarters at the General Post 
Office).
5. A well organized Signal Service is of 
the greatest assistance and positively 
necessary in the even of War, for 
many thousands of money could be 
wasted by false reports and much 
distress caused without burning any 
power. A Hostile Cruiser would have 
to be carefully watched, and our scouts 
reporting her whereabouts by wireless 
would need good assistance from 
shore stations in directing the proper 
disposition of the Defence.
B. Turning now to Naval Training in 
conjunction with Fisheries Protection, 
and considering British Columbia first:
1. We have there a very important 
Industry, and at present an imperfect 
Protection. I would submit that we 
should, if possible, obtain from Great 
Britain two small cruisers, fairly up to 
date, capable of training say 200 men, 
these ships to be bought in, becoming 
in every way our property, sailing under 
our Flag, but to be officered and partly 
manned by Royal Navy, the officers and 
portion of complement being chosen for 
their capabilities as Instructors; these 
officers and men coming entirely under 
the Dominion Government and under 
control of the officer chosen by the 
Government as their Executive.
 The training of Stokers and Seamen 
could go on, and the promising Seamen 
sent to England for a course in Gunnery, 
Document
Kingsmill’s plan for the Canadian Navy, 1909
Officer Commanding Marine Service of Canada to Minister of Marine 
and Fisheries, 19 April 1909, extracts (Library and Archives Canada, 
Record Group 24, Volume 3830, file NS 1017-1-1)
Editor’s note: The file copy of the proposal for Canadian naval development that 
Kingsmill drafted in response to the House of Commons resolution of 29 March 1909 
that called for the “speedy” creation of a naval service. To note is the priority Kingsmill 
gives to fisheries protection, long the issue of maritime security that had most concerned 
the Canadian government, and the need to build the navy on the foundation of the 
government’s existing marine resources. These had long been the essential elements 
in the Laurier government’s policy that Kingsmill had been hired to develop. Also 
significant is the priority Kingsmill gives to the acquisition of “two small cruisers” 
from Britain to serve as training vessels and to strengthen fisheries protection. At this 
time the Admiralty’s advice, given to Australia in 1908, was that the dominions should 
limit themselves to the smallest classes of warships, torpedo boats and destroyers, purely 
for coastal defence. The “small cruisers” of the Sirius class Kingsmill recommends 
were, at 3400 tons displacement, more than three times as big as the largest destroyers, 
and unlike the destroyers had full ocean-going capabilities, together with excellent 
accommodation for training that the destroyers lacked. This recommendation was the 
genesis of the policy carried out by the Canadian government in 1910 with the purchase 
of the British cruisers Rainbow, which was of the Sirius type, for the west coast, and 
the much larger Niobe for the east coast. Those cruisers embodied the idea, planted 
by Kingsmill, that the Canadian navy must, in order to exercise effective control over 
the country’s ocean frontiers, have an ocean-going capacity.
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Torpedo and Signal School, and those 
who were not doing well promptly 
dismissed.
 At Esquimalt we should establish and 
up to date Signal School open to all 
Merchant Seamen, particular attention 
should be given to Telegraphy, Wireless 
and other – this, so that in the event 
of trouble in the East we could have 
a good staff for use in our Mercantile 
Cruisers, and be training a staff for our 
Signal Stations.
2. At present, British Ships of War 
visit the Seal fishing Grounds – this 
duty could be undertaken by our ships 
after the fact is recognized by Foreign 
Governments that Canada has a 
Navy, as also could the Police visits 
of British Ships to British Pacific Ports, 
be, in time, relegated to us. Training 
for our people and an assistance to the 
Imperial Government.
3. The Officer Commanding, or Director, 
or whatever designation he will be 
known by, should have, at Esquimalt, 
an experienced Officer in General 
Charge; for some time this officers 
should be an Officer of the Royal Navy 
with under him, as Understudy, an 
Officer, Canadian if possible, but if not 
one with Seafaring knowledge and the 
necessary education, who has thrown 
in his lot with us. A Staff also would be 
necessary to keep proper returns, for 
all Naval warlike stores, etc., should be 
under the Officer Commanding for the 
Dominion Government, and I cannot 
too strongly advocate the system in 
vogue in the Navy where red tape is 
almost eliminated and fraud easily 
recognized.
 Note: I would submit here that the 
Officer Commanding for Dominion 
Government by styled DIRECTOR 
NAVAL SERVICE [“Service” stroked 
out and ink amended to “Forces”] and 
generally addressed D.N.S.
4. In Great Britain training and education 
of Seaman, who are destined to fill 
positions of responsibility, commences 
at a very early age. With us, at the start, it 
would be necessary that all Candidates 
should pass an examination, the 
standard of which should be fixed by 
the Civil Service Commission, and this 
Examination should be entirely open to 
all, Medical fitness and British origin or 
Canadian Nationality being a sine qua 
non.
C. To now turn to the Atlantic Coast:
 1.  [Original text: “I would advise that 
here we should commence in the same 
way, but that out training should be for 
Torpedo Defence alone, at first.” Ink 
amended to “I would advise that here 
we should commence in the same 
way, but that our training should be 
for Torpedo Defence alone, from one 
cruiser “Canada” at first in conjunction 
with a training school on shore.” Then 
this whole paragraph struck out.] 
 [Original text: “We should procure, to 
start with, two Destroyers of not too 
old a class, but of the best Sea keeping 
qualities.” Ink amended to “We should 
procure on loan, to start with, one 
cruiser of Sirius Class and two Torpedo 
Boat Destroyers.”] With these, and the 
“CANADA,” officered by Royal Naval 
Officers and Instructors, we should 
train the crews of four Destroyers, and 
at the same time [ink insertion: “partly”] 
Protect our Fisheries on the Atlantic 
Seaboard. With [ink insertion:”’Sirius’”] 
two Destroyers and the “CANADA”, 
[Original text “we would have one 
Destroyer’s Complement to train” ink 
amended to “fully manned we should 
have a force of roughly speaking 300 
men under training, a proportion of 
them”] in Barracks on shore, these men 
relieving those on board from time to 
time so that all would get a share of the 
Sea work.
 The best of these men, as in case 
of British Colombia training ships, 
being sent to England to the Gunnery, 
Torpedo and Signal Schools.
2. ...
3. Halifax, from the fact of its Dockyard, 
and being an open Port, should be 
Principal Naval Headquarters on the 
Atlantic Coast, and like Esquimalt, 
should be in charge of, for Executive 
purposes, at first a capable Royal 
Naval Officer, in time relieved by 
his Understudy, who should be his 
Assistant from the beginning; the 
whole establishment being under the 
D.N.S. who would be responsible to 
the Government. At Quebec should 
also be established a Signal Training 
School and late on, as we progress, a 
Naval Station.
4. We should at once commence 
building Destroyers and [original 
text:“Torpedo boats” struck out and 
ink amended to “Cruisers”]. What we 
should build, that is lay down, now as 
soon as possible, would be: Two ocean 
going Destroyers, vessels of 700 to 900 
tons displacement, for the Atlantic: two 
Coastal Destroyers, vessels of 270 tons 
displacement, for the Pacific Coast: 
Four Torpedo boats; the Torpedo boats 
could be built, after a model has been 
obtained, in Canada, to save sending 
them round Cape Horn to British 
Columbia.
 Australia proposes to build:
 3 Ocean going Destroyers, 1st class 
vessels of 700 to 900 tons; 
 1 Ocean going Destroyer, 2nd class 
vessel of 500 to 600 tons;
 16 Coastal Destroyers (now call 
1st class Torpedo boats), 270 tons 
displacement
 4 1st Class Torpedo Boats.
 She has already ordered two ocean 
going Destroyers, and the material for 
a third, which is to be built in Australia.
 We should need, eventually, all that 
Australia proposes and our Cruisers 
after that…
Roger Sarty is professor of history at 
Wilfrid Laurier University and the editor-
in-chief of Canadian Military History.
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